Do Client Problems Derive From a Common Irrationality
Or Specific Irrational Beliefs?
Chris D. Erickson, John J. Horan, and Gail Hackett
Division of Psychology in Education
Arizona State University
Running head: THINKING AND FEELING
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, August 18,
1991
8/12/91
Abstract
Two studies have reported that low self-esteem is related to the holding of four specific
irrational beliefs; further studies have suggested that these and other irrational beliefs are
associated with different client problems. The present study attempted 1) to replicate the
self-esteem findings with a younger population and improved controls, and 2) to explore whether
other client problems derive from similar or different irrational beliefs. High school students
(n=102) completed self-report measures of irrational beliefs, self-esteem, depression, facilitative
anxiety, debilitative anxiety, neuroticism and extraversion. Teacher ratings of self-esteem
behaviors and cumulative grade-point-averages were also obtained. Regression analyses
indicated that a) two of the four previously identified irrational beliefs again predicted low
self-esteem; b) theoretically-appropriate divergent relationships occurred on the control
measures; and c) low self-esteem and other client problems are characterized by both common
and unique sources of irrationality.
On Thinking and Feeling Bad:
Do Client Problems Derive From a Common Irrationality
Or Specific Irrational Beliefs?
Many authors representing various classical schools of psychotherapy have focused on the role
of irrational beliefs in the etiology of psychological dysfunction (e.g., Angyal, 1951; Ellis, 1962;
Horney, 1950; Kelly, 1951; Raimy, 1955). In more recent years these seminal speculations have
been corroborated by myriad studies reporting significant relationships between general
measures of irrationality and a wide array of psychological problems including anger (Zwemer
& Deffenbacher, l984; Rohsenow & Smith, l982), anxiety (Tobacyk & Downs, l986; Zwemer &
Deffenbacher, l984), depression (Cash, 1984; Cook & Peterson, 1986; Hyer, Jacobsen, &
Harrison, l985; Rohsenow & Smith, l982; Van Den Bout, l986; Vestre, l984), low self-esteem
(Daly & Burton, 1983), nonassertiveness (Cash, 1984), poor problem-solving (Heppner, Reeder,
& Larson, l983; Tobacyk & Milford, l982) and schizophrenia (Newmark & Whitt, l983).
A number of studies have examined the effects of specific irrational beliefs on several of these
problems. Daly and Burton (1983), for example, used the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT, Jones,
1969) and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (J-F, Eagly, 1967) to chronicle the kinds
of irrationality related to the development of low self-esteem. The IBT is a widely known
device consisting of 10 subscales corresponding to 10 common irrational beliefs articulated by
Ellis (1962). Daly and Burton found that four of these subscales (namely, demand for approval,
high self-expectations, anxious overconcern, and problem avoidance) were the best predictors of
low self-esteem; none of the other scales significantly enhanced the utility of the regression
equation. In effect, Daly and Burton provided a direct empirical link between four specific
beliefs and self-esteem.
The Daly and Burton study raises two important theoretical questions: 1. Are their findings
replicable with alternative measures and methods for assessing self-esteem, a younger
population, and improved control procedures? 2. Are these same specific irrational beliefs
associated with other client problems, or are other client problems characterized by their own
unique constellation of irrational thoughts?
Replicability
The question of replicability was partly answered by McLennan (1987) who confirmed that these
same four irrational beliefs were associated with low self-esteem assessed with a different
self-report device (i.e., the Self-Esteem Scale, Rosenberg, l965). However, both the McLennan
and the Daly and Burton investigations suffer from mono-method bias (Cook & Campbell,
1979), that is, the use of a single assessment method (self-report) to represent the self-esteem
construct. It is not known, for example, to what extent the obtained relationships are an artifact
of common method variance. Different methods as well as measures of self-esteem are essential
to better "triangulate on the referent" (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 65).
Although the measurement of self-esteem using alternative methods poses a thorny assessment
task in adult populations, Chiu (1987) reportedly achieved some degree of psychometric success
in doing so using teacher ratings of school children. The use of a younger population in the
present study has both advantages and disadvantages. Should the relationships hold, the external
validity of the Daly-Burton and McLennan findings would be enhanced, and the consistency of
the psychological phenomena over a longer age span would be established. A failure to
replicate, however, would not seriously challenge the Daly-Burton and McLennan conclusions
which derive from an older population.
Furthermore, although the Daly-Burton and McLennan studies provide confirmatory evidence in
favor of the relationship between specific irrational beliefs and low self-esteem, the opportunity
for disconfirmatory evidence to appear was negligible. Therefore, the present study used
additional control measures having little or no theoretical relevance. These were the
Extraversion Subtest of The Eysenck Neuroticism-Extraversion Scale (Eysenck, 1958), the
Facilitative Anxiety Subscale of the Achievement Anxiety Test Scale (Alpert & Haber, 1960),
and grade-point-average, which on an a priori basis would presumably fail to correlate at all.
Specific Irrationality and Other Client Problems
The issue of disconfirmatory evidence also suggests that it would be appropriate to examine the
relationships between irrational beliefs and other client problems. Depression, debilitative
anxiety, and neuroticism, for example, would presumably be less related to the four specific
irrational beliefs, than those beliefs are related to self-esteem. If not, then these specific
irrational beliefs would appear to play a much greater role in psychological dysfunction than is
now assumed. If so, then one might more efficiently tailor cognitive restructuring interventions
to specific client problems.
Several studies have shed indirect light on this question, but the total picture remains cloudy.
McLennan (1987), for example, reported that one of the irrational beliefs involved with low
self-esteem (anxious overconcern), along with two additional uninvolved beliefs (helplessness
and frustration reactivity) were predictive of depression as measured by the Zung Depression
Inventory (Zung, l965).
Earlier, Cash (1984) found that two of these beliefs (anxious overconcern and perfectionism)
predicted depression as measured by the Beck Depression inventory (BDI, Beck, 1970);
however, high self-expectations and problem-avoidance, linked previously by Daly and Burton
and McLennan to low self-esteem, were also involved with depression. It thus might be argued
that insofar as specific irrationality is concerned, depression measured by the BDI has more in
common with self-esteem than it does with depression measured by the Zung.
Moreover, Deffenbacher and his colleagues (Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill, & Sloan,
l986) examined the relationship between the IBT and a large battery of self-report anxiety
measures. In general, they found four specific irrational beliefs to be predictive of anxiety; these
were frustration reactivity, helplessness, and perfectionism (all previously associated with
depression), and anxious overconcern (previously associated with both low self-esteem and
depression),.
Given that self-esteem, depression, and anxiety have been conceptually and psychometrically
linked in the literature (Beck, 1990a; Beck, 1990b), it should come as no surprise to observe that
in the foregoing studies these client problems are characterized by common and unique sources
of irrationality. Nevertheless, these collated data do not speak well to the issue of
disconfirmatory evidence. Only demand for approval appears uniquely related to low
self-esteem. Anxious overconcern, on the other hand, characterizes all three client problems.
The other irrational beliefs, if involved with any client problem, are involved with two: High
self-expectations and problem avoidance contribute to low self-esteem and depression;
frustration-reactivity, helplessness and perfectionism predict both depression and anxiety.
Of course it is not known to what extent common method variance, psychometric inadequacies,
sample vaguries and so forth contribute to or detract from the stability of the foregoing pattern.
A simultaneousassessment of all variables on the same sample might help clarify the
relationships between these constructs.
In the present study, the following client problems were concurrently measured: Depression
(using the Beck Depression Inventory), debilitative anxiety (through the Achievement Anxiety
Test Scale), and neuroticism (via the Eysenck Neuroticism-Extraversion Scale). Resource
limitations precluded the use of alternative methods for assessing these problems. The logic of
disconfirmatory evidence would suggest that the specific beliefs predictive of diminished
self-esteem should yield weaker relationships with measures of other client problems (that is,
unless all of these problems derive from a common irrationality).
In sum, the present study attempted to replicate the self-esteem findings of Daly-Burton and
McLennan with a different population and improved controls, and to explore whether other
client problems derive from similar or different irrational beliefs. Essentially, the outcome
pattern was expected to reflect that the relationships between measures of irrationality, low
self-esteem, control variables, and other client problems would all converge and diverge in the
appropriate theoretical directions.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 102 tenth and eleventh grade students enrolled in six high-school social-science
courses taught by two teachers in both semesters of the 1989-1990 academic year.
Measures
The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT), developed by Jones (l969), is designed to measure the amount
of agreement respondents have with each of Ellis' (l962) ten irrational beliefs. The test consists
of l00 Likert-type items, ten per belief. Sample items are: "I hate to fail at anything" and "I want
everyone to like me." Jones named the l0 subscales as follows: demand for approval, high
self-expectations, blame proneness, frustration reactivity, emotional irresponsibility, anxious
overconcern, problem avoidance, dependency, helplessness, and perfectionism. Jones (l969)
reported internal consistency estimates for the individual scales ranging from .66 to .80, a
test-retest reliability coefficient of .92, and a concurrent validity coefficient of .6l obtained with
ratings of psychiatric problems.
The Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (J-F, Eagly, 1967) is a twenty item measure which
includes questions such as: "How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do
well?". The items are answered on a five-point Likert scale and are balanced for response set.
The J-F has been found to have adequate validity and reliability (see Hamilton, 1971).
The Self-Esteem Scale (SES, Rosenberg, l965) consists of l0 statements such as "I certainly feel
useless at times" to which subjects indicate their agreement or disagreement. Silber and Tippett
(l965) found a two week test-retest reliability coefficient of .85, and concurrent validity
coefficients ranging from .56 to .83. The SES was developed specifically for use with high
school students, hence it was chosen to complement the J-F.
The Self-Esteem Rating Scale for Children (SERSC, Chiu, l987) attempts to measure
self-esteem through teacher ratings. The SERSC contains l2 statements, such as "Hesitates to
speak up in class", which are rated on five point scales from "never" to "always." Chiu (1987)
reported a one-month test-retest reliability coefficient of .93 and interrater reliability coefficients
of .82, .83 and .86 for three classes of students. Chiu also found concurrent validity coefficients
of .56 and .54 using sociometric measures and popularity rankings by teachers.
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, 1970) is a 21-item measure of depression in a
multiple-choice format. Each item derives from a specific symptom of depression identified in
the psychiatric literature such as sadness, insomnia, and guilt (Stehouwer, l985). Respondents
choose one of four descriptors regarding the severity of their symptom. (Given the age of the
population and the sensitivity of the setting, the item pertaining to "sex" was changed to
"dating.") Beck (l970) reported a test-retest reliability of .90 and concurrent validity coefficients
of.65 and .67 obtained using psychiatric ratings and the MMPI-D Scale.
The Achievement Anxiety Test Scale (AATS, Alpert & Haber, l960) contains two Likert-type
subscales assessing the degree to which anxiety facilitates or debilitates performance. The
Facilitative subscale has nine items such as "Nervousness while taking a test helps me do better."
The Debilitative subscale contains l0 items including "The more important the exam, the less
well I seem to do." Alpert and Haber (l960) obtained test-retest reliabilities of .83 and .87 over a
ten week period; concurrent validity coefficients of .38 and -.38 were found with general anxiety
scales.
The Eysenck Neuroticism/Extraversion Scale (N/E, Eysenck, l958) is a 12-item,
paper-and-pencil inventory measuring the traits of neuroticism and extraversion. Respondents
answer "yes" or "no" to items such as "Would you rate yourself as a lively individual?" Eysenck
(1958) reported split-half reliabilities for the Extraversion and Neuroticism subscales of .71 and
.79 respectively; test-retest reliabilities were slightly higher.
Grade Point Average Cumulative high school grade point averages (GPAs) were obtained from
student files.
Analysis Plan
The ten subscales of the IBT served as predictor variables; the remaining devices functioned as
criteria. Self-esteem was a primary criterion operationally defined by three measures
representing two different methods of assessment (the J-F and the SES vs the SERSC).
Presumably, the four designated subscales of the IBT should strongly predict self esteem, and
fail to predict scores on control devices, namely the Extraversion subscale of the N/E, the
Facilitative Anxiety subscale of the AATS, and GPA. The remaining dependant variables (the
BDI, the Debilitative Anxiety subscale of the AATS, and the Neuroticism subscale of the N/E)
were cast in the role of exploratory criteria to address the question of whether or not the specific
thoughts that account for lowered self-esteem are associated with other clinical concerns as well.
Procedures
Informed consent was obtained from both parents and students. The students were told simply
that they were taking part in a "Survey of Student Beliefs." Students completed the IBT, J-F,
SES, N/E, AATS, and the BDI during their social science classes. Less than one hour was
required to finish all six measures. The two social science teachers concurrently completed the
SERSC on their own students in the six classes. Since individual student course-schedules were
highly variable, an additional group of six teachers of other courses were needed to secure an
independant SERSC rating on a sample of 40 of these students. GPA data was obtained from
student records.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Of the 102 students who participated, 12 were dropped from the analysis because of incomplete
data. All results reported below pertain to the remaining 90 subjects.
The attempt to assess self-esteem via an alternative method (the SERSC) yielded unreliable, and
hence unusable data. An insignificant inter-rater reliability coefficient of .29 was obtained
between the two sets of teachers; hence these data were not considered further.
Inter-correlations between all measures are presented in Table 1. Forward stepwise regressions
were run in which the ten irrational beliefs were regressed on each criterion variable in order to
isolate the unique variance attributable to each belief. These regression analyses are
summarized in Table 2; only those predictors contributing significantly to the regression
equation are shown.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.
Regression Analyses Pertaining to the Question of Replicability
Question 1 concerned whether the findings of Daly and Burton (1983) and McLennan (1987)
were replicable with alternative measures and methods for assessing self-esteem, a younger
population, and improved control procedures. Both Daly/Burton and McLennan identified four
specific irrational beliefs as precursors to low self-esteem, namely, demand for approval, high
self-expectations, anxious overconcern, and problem avoidance.
In the present study (see Table 2) the specific irrational beliefs most predictive of low
self-esteem as measured by the Janis Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (J-F) were: demand for
approval (F = 16.51, p < .0001), anxious overconcern (F = 6.72, p < .01), and helplessness (F =
6.46, p < .01). Curiously, perfectionism was found to predict high self-esteem (F = 5.34, p <
.05). This stepwise regression model accounted for 40 percent of the variance (p < .0001).
A second stepwise multiple regression using the Self-Esteem Scale (SES) produced similar
results. The irrational beliefs found to be most predictive of low self-esteem were: Anxious
Overconcern (F=10.49, p < .01), Demand for Approval (F = 9.47, p < .01), and helplessness (F =
9.16, p < .01). Perfectionism was again found to be predictive of high self-esteem (F = 4.27, p <
.05). This model accounted for 42 percent of the variance (p < .0001).
In sum, the present study found that two of the four irrational beliefs identified by Daly/Burton
and McLennan were predictive of low self-esteem on both self-report measures (i.e., demand for
approval and anxious overconcern). However, two other irrational beliefs, not previously
identified, were also linked to self-esteem: Helplessness was related to low self-esteem and
perfectionism predicted high self-esteem.
The regression analyses on each of the control measures all yielded theoretically-appropriate
divergent relationships. None of the irrational beliefs predicted extraversion, and those
irrational beliefs which were found to be linked to facilitative anxiety and grade point average
were not associated with self-esteem.
More specifically, two irrational beliefs were found to predict facilitative anxiety, namely,
frustration reactivity (F = 6.01, p < .01) and emotional irresponsibility (F = 4.27, p < .05). (The
higher the irrationality, the more facilitative anxiety reported). This model accounted for 14
percent of the variance (p < .001).
The analysis of grade point average data revealed two beliefs as most predictive of low GPA;
these were emotional irresponsibility (F = 9.58, p < .01) and blame proneness (F = 5.82, p < .05).
Curiously, a third irrational belief, high self-expectations (F =4.92, p < .05), was found to
significantly predict high GPA (apparantly, having "irrational" self-expectations contributes to
academic success). This model accounted for 13 percent of the variance (p < .001).
Regression Analyses Pertaining to the Question of These Specific Irrational Beliefs in Other
Client Problems
Question 2 concerned whether the same specific irrational beliefs associated with low
self-esteem were likewise linked to other client problems, or were other client problems
characterized by their own unique constellation of irrational thoughts? The logic of
disconfirmatory evidence would suggest that the specific beliefs predictive of diminished
self-esteem should yield weaker relationships with measures of other client problems (that is,
unless all of these problems derive from a common irrationality).
The regression analysis performed on the BDI data yielded three irrational beliefs being most
predictive of depression: helplessness (F = 6.83, p < .01), problem avoidance (F = 5.13, p < .05),
and anxious overconcern (F = 4.58, p < .05). These three beliefs accounted for 28 percent of the
variance (p < .0001).
The analysis of the neuroticism scale indicated that the same three beliefs which predicted
depression were significantly linked to neuroticism as well, namely, anxious overconcern (F =
10.52, p < .01), problem avoidance (F = 8.23, p < .01), and helplessness (F = 4.90, p < .05).
These beliefs accounted for 37 percent of the variance (p < .0001).
Three beliefs significantly predicted debilitative anxiety; these were helplessness (F = 23.73, p <
.0001), problem avoidance (F = 8.87, p < .01), both common to depression and neuroticism, and
perfectionism (F = 7.63, p < .01). Thirty-six percent of the variance was accounted for by these
beliefs (p < .0001).
In so far as specific irrationality is concerned, depression and neuroticism have everything in
common, and much in common with debilitative anxiety, namely, helplessness and problem
avoidance. However, anxious overconcern additionally characterizes depression and
neuroticism, whereas perfectionism further defines debilitative anxiety.
Low self-esteem, likewise, is associated with both common and unique sources of irrationallity.
Demand for approval is linked only to low self-esteem; however, diminished self-esteem shares
1) anxious overconcern with depression and neuroticism, and 2) helplessness and perfectionism
with debilitating anxiety.
Discussion
With regard to question 1, the results of this study offer a partial replication and extension of the
Daly/Burton and McLennan findings to a younger subject pool. Two previously identified
beliefs, demand for approval and anxious overconcern, were again found to predict low
self-esteem; two other beliefs, however, did not hold up in the present study, namely, high
self-expectations and problem avoidance. Instead, two new irrational beliefs were linked to the
development of low self-esteem; these were helplessness and perfectionism, the latter in the
opposite direction. This failure to completely replicate does not seriously challenge the findings
of the earlier studies which were conducted on older samples. Perhaps the relationship between
specific irrational beliefs and low self-esteem varies across the lifespan.
Moreover, although these results were consistent on both self-report measures of self-esteem, an
unacceptably low inter-rater reliability on the SESRC precluded an examination of the role of
monomethod bias. Chiu (1987) was able to achieve psychometric success using
elementary-school teachers to rate self-esteem behaviors; perhaps the high-school teacher raters
in the present study were comparatively less able to do so given their briefer daily contacts and
increased student loads.
On all control measures, however, theoretically appropriate divergences occurred. None of the
specific irrational beliefs related to self-esteem in this study, (or indeed in the Daly/Burton and
McLennan investigations) was linked to extraversion, facilitative anxiety or grade point average.
With regard to question 2, the results of this study are reasonably consistent with the literature
review. Moreover, the attempt to address the problem of sample vagaries in the literature by
simultaneously assessing all client problems on a single sample adds confidence to the
conclusions. In this study, demand for approval uniquely characterizes low self-esteem, which,
however, shares helplessness and anxious overconcern with depression and neuroticism, and
helplessness and perfectionism with debilitating anxiety. Problem avoidance did not contribute
to low self-esteem; it did, however, predict depression, anxiety and neuroticism. In sum, low
self-esteem and the other client problems measured in this study appear to derive from both
common and ideosyncratic irrational roots, a phenomenon which at least partially addresses the
issue of discriminant validity.
The finding that demand for approval uniquely characterizes low self-esteem is fully consistent
with all previous investigations. Concerning depression, the results of this study are consistent
with earlier studies. Helplessness, problem avoidance and anxious overconcern have all been
previously shown to be related to depression. However, frustration reactivity, and high
self-expectations, both of which have already been linked to depression, were not found to be
significant predictors in this study. These results would appear to support Beck's (1979)
contention that depressives tend to maintain a belief system that encourages negative
self-assessments and negative affect.
With regard to anxiety, the present findings partially replicate Deffenbacher (1986). Both
helplessness and perfectionism were linked to anxiety in the present study, as they were earlier.
Problem avoidance, however, was also identified in relation to anxiety in this study and had not
been mentioned previously. Further, anxious overconcern and frustration reactivity were not
linked to anxiety in the present study, although they had been identified by Deffenbacher. One
possible contribution to the differences in findings could be the use of different measures to
assess anxiety in the previous study.
The results of this study concerning neuroticism seem theoretically consistent. Two of the
beliefs found to be predictive of neuroticism in this study were also predictive of anxiety
(problem avoidance and helplessness). The third belief, anxious overconcern, is likewise
theoretically relevant.
Overall, these findings seem to indicate that certain irrational beliefs are discriminantly
predictive of a variety of clinical problems, including low self-esteem, depression, anxiety and
neuroticism. The specific beliefs identified seem to imply strict demands of, and negative
expectations about life events as well as a negative style of processing personally relevant
information.
The results of this study have important implications for both practice and research. One of the
more practical applications of these findings would be to tailor a structured cognitive therapy
intervention program to target the specific irrationalities associated with the client problem.
Such a program could significantly enhance the efficacy of cognitive treatments of these clinical
problems. This study also serves to further illuminate the intricate interrelationships of the
cognitions underlying low self-esteem and other common client problems. One possibly
important research direction could be to further clarify the specific kinds of self-statements that
combine to make up the irrational beliefs identified as problematic. Such information could
prove useful in gaining a better understanding of the etiological factors involved in these
important client problems.
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On Thinking and Feeling Bad: